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Abstract
Computational perspectivalism has been recently proposed as an
alternative to mainstream accounts of physical computation, and es-
pecially to the teleologically-based mechanistic view. It takes phys-
ical computation to be partly dependent on explanatory perspectives,
and eschews appeal to teleology in helping individuate computational
systems. I assess several varieties of computational perspectivalism,
showing that they either collapse into existing non-perspectival views;
or end up with unsatisfactory or implausible accounts of physical
computation. Computational perspectivalism fails therefore to be a
compelling alternative to perspective-independent theories of compu-
tation in physical systems. I conclude that a teleologically-based,
non-perspectival mechanistic account of physical computation is to
be preferred.
1 Introduction
The notion of computation plays a central role in several scientific endeav-
ours, and especially in the computer and cognitive sciences. These two
fields  understood broadly  not only use computational tools and mod-
els in their investigations, but have as their subject matter physical systems
believed to be computational in nature. This claim is somewhat more con-
troversial in the case of the cognitive sciences, as the computational theory
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of cognition, despite its widespread adoption since the Cognitive Revolution
in the '50s, has found many detractors through the years. However, occa-
sional scepticism notwithstanding, a large consensus has formed around the
idea that cognitive systems are computational  a consensus that survives
and thrives to this day (Kriegeskorte & Douglas 2018). Their computa-
tional nature, moreover, is supposed to help explain their cognitive nature
and their capacity to lead to intelligent behaviour. As Fodor (1985, p. 93)
once put it, the fundamental breakthrough of the Cognitive Revolution in
comparison to past (representational) theories of mind was the adoption of
the notion of computation to explain cognitive processing.
Naturalising physical computation is often taken to be crucial for the pro-
ject of the cognitive sciences1. Given its central place in the computational-
cum-representational basic framework of the cognitive sciences, philosophers
aim to produce naturalistic theories that yield a robust, objective, non-trivial
notion of computation in physical systems. Attacks against the feasibility
of this project have been taken to cast doubt on the foundations of the
cognitive sciences (e.g. Putnam 1988, Searle 1992, Van Gelder 1995)2. The
underlying worry is that without such a naturalistic account of computation,
mainstream cognitive science would be missing one of its sustaining pillars,
the computational theory of cognition.
In the past decade, a particularly promising robust theory of computation
has gained traction: the mechanistic view of computation (Piccinini 2015,
Milkowski 2013, Fresco 2014, Coelho Mollo 2018). Piccinini's version of the
view, in which appeal to natural teleology plays a crucial role, has been es-
pecially influential. The mechanistic view seems particularly well-equipped
to satisfy three important desiderata for theories of physical computation,
namely i) avoiding pancomputationalism  the claim that everything com-
putes; ii) making space for the normativity of computation, i.e. the distinc-
tion between correct computation and miscomputation; and iii) adequately
capturing scientific practice and the explanatory role computation plays in
such practice.
Recently, an alternative approach to the problem of physical computation
has been defended by Schweizer (2016, 2019) and Dewhurst (2018a): com-
putational perspectivalism. According to computational perspectivalism,
1In what follows I often refer to physical computation simply as `computation', as my
concern in this paper is exclusively with computation in physical systems (rather than in
mathematical theory).
2Sprevak (2018) offers a good critical overview of these attacks and of the most popular
responses.
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the nature of computational systems and processes hinges on explanatory
perspectives that observers take toward physical systems. Dewhurst's and
Schweizer's versions of computational perspectivalism are importantly differ-
ent. One key difference is that while the former endorses a non-teleological
version of the mechanistic account, the latter fully rejects the mechanistic
view. Crucially, both invite a fundamentally different view of the nature
and explanatory role of the notion of computation in science to that offered
by teleological versions of the mechanistic account.
In this paper, I argue that computational perspectivalism fails to be a
compelling alternative to objective (i.e. perspective-independent) views of
the nature of computation, and especially to the teleo-based mechanistic
view. I examine several versions of computational perspectivalism, showing
that they either collapse into existing non-perspectival views; or end up
with unsatisfactory or implausible accounts of physical computation. The
teleo-based mechanistic view is therefore to be preferred.
Here is how I will proceed in what follows. In section 2 I briefly present
the teleo-based mechanistic view of computation, which is the most plaus-
ible theory of computation on offer, and the framework to which compu-
tational perspectivalism aims to be a more compelling alternative. I then
explore some varieties of perspectivalism in section 3, before examining
computational perspectivalism and its virtues for what regards fulfilling the
desiderata for theories of physical computation in section 4. Finally, in
section 5 I argue that all varieties of computational perspectivalism have
important shortcomings, making the approach less compelling than standard
teleo-based mechanistic views.
2 The Mechanistic View of Computation
The mechanistic view of physical computation is an application to the no-
tion of computation of the neo-mechanistic approach to science and sci-
entific explanation, which has been very influential in the past few decades
(Machamer et al. 2000). The basic idea behind the mechanistic framework is
that (much of) science aims at revealing the mechanisms responsible for phe-
nomena. Scientific explanation consists (largely) in identifying the relevant
mechanism that explains a certain phenomenon of interest. This requires
identifying the parts of the mechanism, what they do (i.e. their activit-
ies), and how they are organised. Mechanisms are always mechanisms for
a certain phenomenon. Mechanistic decomposition reveals the componen-
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tial and functional organisation of a system relevant for bringing about the
phenomenon of interest3.
Parts of mechanisms have systemic functions, i.e. their specific causal
contributions to the behaviour of the overall mechanism. They may also have
teleological, or `proper' functions. That is, they may have functions that they
are in a certain sense supposed to perform. Artefacts are a clear example
of systems that have teleological functions, or teleofunctions for short. An
electronic calculator is supposed to perform some mathematical operations
on the inputs we provide. There is something it is for the calculator to work
properly, i.e. when it correctly carries out the operations it is supposed to
carry out, thus fulfilling its teleological function. And there is something it
is for the calculator to work improperly, i.e. when it fails to carry out the
appropriate operations, thus failing to fulfil its teleological function4. Even
in the latter case, the calculator can be mechanistically decomposed, and its
parts ascribed systemic functions that help explain how come it generates
the (incorrect) outputs that it does. Teleological functions involve a sort of
normativity; a claim about what a system is supposed to do, which is to
some extent independent of its occurrent causal powers and the causal roles
of its parts, i.e. their systemic functions.
While many or most mechanisms do not possess teleofunctions (e.g.
weather systems), according to influential versions of the mechanistic view,
some do (e.g. calculators, hearts). They are teleofunctional mechanisms
(Garson 2013, Piccinini 2015). Piccinini's influential mechanistic account of
computation has it that computational systems are teleofunctional mechan-
isms that possess the teleofunction to perform computations. It is a realist
theory of computation, which upholds the objective existence of physical
computation and of teleological functions. Although there is considerable
variation among different versions of the teleo-based mechanistic view, the
following individuation conditions seem largely to be shared among pro-
ponents (adapted from Coelho Mollo 2018, p. 3487).
Physical computation consists in:
3Though typically the mechanistic view is framed as being committed to realism about
scientific posits, it need not be (Colombo et al. 2015).
4Artefactual teleofunctions, in contrast to the teleofunctions of biological systems,
may partly depend on the intentions of designers and users. This does not make such
teleofunctions less objective, since they hinge on facts of the matter about what intentions
were at play in designing and/or using the system. Spelling out the specific role of
intentions, if any, in determining such teleofunctions is an aim of theories of artefactual
function (see Artiga 2016).
4
1. Manipulation of medium-independent vehicles according to a rule sens-
itive only to their degrees of freedom;
2. The medium-independent vehicles are components of a teleofunctional
mechanism;
3. The manipulations that vehicles undergo are activities internal to a
teleofunctional mechanism;
4. It is one of the teleological functions of the teleofunctional mechanism
to carry out 1.
Two notions play a crucial role in the account: teleological functions, and
medium-independence. A physical system must have the teleofunction to
compute, if it is to count as computational (Coelho Mollo 2019). Moreover,
its vehicles are individuated in medium-independent terms (Haugeland 1985)5.
This means that the behaviour of computational systems is best captured by
factors that do not depend on the details of the physical constitution of its
parts. Rather, the relevant factors are the dimensions of variation of phys-
ical variables of the components  their degrees of freedom. Thus physical
systems made of different materials can be computational; and may perform
identical computations despite implementational differences provided that
their physical dimensions of variation are relevantly similar6.
2.1 Teleological Functions and Meeting the Desiderata
Teleology is a notion that calls for naturalisation, if it is to be legitimately
employed in our scientific and philosophical theories. It involves ideas of
purpose and normativity that seem prima facie difficult to explain in natur-
alistic, non-intentional terms. Naturalistic theories of teleological function
try to dispel this impression. They can be divided into two broad families:
dispositional theories, and selected-effects theories.
Dispositional theories bestow teleological functions on systems and their
parts in light of their causal dispositions. Among dispositional theories,
5The notion of medium-independence is not uncontroversial, especially for what re-
gards how stringent it is and which kinds of properties count as medium-independent.
In this paper, I will take for granted that the notion is sufficiently stringent as to set
it apart from other notions, such as weaker forms of multiple realisation. See Piccinini
(2015, chap. 7) and Coelho Mollo (2019) for extended discussion.
6The latter point has been put in doubt by Haimovici (2013) and Dewhurst (2018b),
a move criticised by Coelho Mollo (2018) and Fresco & Milkowski (forthcoming).
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goal-based theories have received the most favour. According to them, the
teleofunctions of a system and/or its parts are determined by their dispos-
itions to contribute to a set of privileged goals of organisms  typically
survival and inclusive fitness (Boorse 1976, Maley & Piccinini 2017).
Selected-effects theories, on the other hand, bestow teleofunctions on
systems and their parts in light of the causal contributions of past instances
of the same type of system and/or part, contributions which account for the
selection and persistence across time of instances of the type (Millikan 1984,
Neander 1991). While natural selection tends to be most often appealed to,
several kinds of selection processes may be relevant. A promising recent view
is Garson's (2011), which accords natural selection as well as other kinds of
selection processes a role in the bestowal of teleofunctions to systems.
The teleo-based mechanistic view of computation need not be committed
to a specific theory of teleological functions. It does however commit to there
being a robust, objective theory of teleological functions able to ground the
overall realist take on computation that it defends (Coelho Mollo 2019).
This is a vulnerability of the view, given that its success hinges on whether
a robust naturalistic theory of teleology can be provided. In section 5,
I give defeasible reasons to lend credence to the latter claim, although I
remain neutral on what naturalistic theory of teleofunctions is more likely
to succeed.
Appeal to teleofunctions plays an important role in the mechanistic ac-
count, insofar as it helps to avoid pancomputationalism, i.e. the claim that
all or most physical systems compute. Pancomputationalism risks mak-
ing the notion of computation trivial, and its explanatory role vacuous: if
everything computes, an explanation of how appeal to computation is non-
etheless useful and informative is called for7. Moreover, pancomputation-
alism does not sit well with scientific practices in the computer sciences,
which distinguish between systems that actually compute from those that
can be merely computationally described or modelled8. While the latter
category includes a large domain of physical systems, the former is taken
to be much more restricted. Theories of physical computation that avoid
pancomputationalism should thereby be preferred. According to the teleo-
based mechanistic view, only a subset of mechanisms are teleofunctional. In
turn, only a small subset of the latter are teleofunctional mechanisms that
7As we will see in section 4.1, limited forms of pancomputationalism avoid triviality.
8See Shagrir (1999) for an overview of earlier proposals on how to draw the distinction.
Shagrir defends a semantic criterion, which is at odds with standard versions of the
mechanistic view of computation.
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possess the teleological function to compute. It follows that few systems are
computational, whereby the mechanistic view succeeds in avoiding pancom-
putationalism, and does justice to the practices of the relevant sciences.
Physical computation plausibly involves a form of normativity. That is
to say, for a system to be computational there must be something it is for
it to compute correctly, and something it is for it to compute incorrectly,
or miscompute. This is not an uncontroversial claim. Causal accounts, for
instance, have it that physical computation captures abstractly described
causal structure(s) that map onto a computational formalism (Chalmers
2011). There is no sense in which a causal structure, as causal structure, can
succeed or fail. The computational rules that such systems follow are mere
causal regularities mappable onto an abstract computational description at
a certain point in time (Chalmers 2012, p. 230). In consequence, causal
views tend to deny that making space for miscomputation is essential to an
account of computation.
I take this to be ill-advised. The notion of computation is interesting
to philosophers and scientists alike because it seems to have a distinctive
explanatory role; a role that is not identical to that of other concepts that
we already possess, such as that of abstract causal structure. Moreover,
appeal to miscomputation plays important explanatory roles in computer
as well as in cognitive science, as computational neuroscience and compu-
tational psychiatry make vivid (Fresco & Primiero 2013, Wang & Krystal
2014, Colombo forthcoming).
A satisfying account of physical computation  as desideratum (iii) pre-
scribes  should vindicate the foundational and explanatory distinctiveness
of the notion, making clear how it can play the roles it does as a theoretical
posit in the computer and cognitive sciences. Accepting that computation
involves a form of normativity, that computations can go wrong (and thus
also right), seems essential to fulfil these requirements. It sets computa-
tion apart from causal structure, given the latter's lack of normativity, and
accommodates the explanatory appeal to miscomputation in our sciences.
Making space for miscomputation is thereby a plausible desideratum for
theories of physical computation.
Computational processes respect rules that fix the transitions between
inputs, internal states, and outputs. This means that a physical computa-
tional system may for a variety of reasons fail to respect such rules. Such
failure may be of at least two kinds9.
9For a much more sophisticated taxonomy of kinds of miscomputation, see Fresco &
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It may be a failure of some component that makes it so that the system
simply fails to compute  as for instance if the microprocessors of my elec-
tronic computer were to stop working (an example that I hope will always
inhabit only the counterfactual realm). This is not a proper case of miscom-
putation, since no computation, and therefore no miscomputation, is being
performed.
More interestingly, the failure may be such that the system computes,
but fails to follow the computational rule it was supposed to follow. For ex-
ample, my word processing software may, due to some internal defect, take
my pressing of the `a' key in the keyboard as input and generate as output
in my display the symbol s, where the function it should have computed
was from an `a' key press to the displaying of the symbol a. For miscom-
putation to be possible, there must be a gap between what the system does
and what it is supposed to do, such that these can match (correct computa-
tion) or mismatch (miscomputation)10. The foregoing mechanistic account
of computation, given its reliance on teleological functions in the individu-
ation of computational systems, naturally makes space for miscomputation.
Whenever a computational system computes a function different from the
one it is its teleofunction to compute, there is an instance of miscomputation.
3 Varieties of Perspectivalism
Dewhurst (2018a) has recently suggested that the mechanistic view of com-
putation should not include a commitment to teleological functions in indi-
viduating computation. The notion of teleofunction, according to Dewhurst,
has problematic naturalistic credentials, clashes with the notion of function
most useful to cognitive and neuroscience  namely systemic functions (see
section 2)  and at any rate represents an ontological commitment that
the mechanistic view can do without  and of course the fewer problematic
ontological commitments, ceteris paribus, the stronger the theory. Dewhurst
recommends instead a perspectival approach to mechanisms and functions,
following Craver (2013). Schweizer (2016, 2019) has argued for an alternative
perspectival view of computation, which is not committed to the mechanistic
account. My aim for the remainder of this paper is to show that perspectival-
Primiero (2013). For my purposes in this paper, the coarse distinction below suffices.
10See Tucker (forthcoming) for an extended argument for the need of such a gap,
and more generally for a compelling and detailed account of miscomputation within the
mechanistic view.
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ism is not a promising approach to computation. Before moving to that, we
must be clear on what computational perspectivalism, in its many varieties,
involves.
Perspectivalism (or perspectivism) in philosophy of science encompasses
a variety of positions that go from the rather trivial to the ontologically revi-
sionary, with Kantian-flavoured views somewhere in between11. What they
share is the idea that knowledge of the world is mediated, in more or less
essential ways, by theoretical and pretheoretical assumptions, mathemat-
ical and experimental apparatus, explanatory interests and purposes, which
come to compose a perspective that individuals and/or scientific communit-
ies take toward the world. That thesis, by itself, is uncontroversial. There is
little doubt that our scientific knowledge of the world and that our methods
for expanding it involve taking perspectives so understood. As philosophers
of science have insisted for quite some time, there are no unmediated ways
of deriving theories from `raw' data. Epistemic perspectivalism of this type
is innocuous, and widely accepted.
There are less innocuous versions of epistemic perspectivalism. Stronger
forms of epistemic perspectivalism take the mediation of our knowledge of
the world by perspectives to place important constraints on what we can
know. By their lights, some or all of our scientific knowledge is intrinsically
perspectival, and we are barred from gaining knowledge about perspective-
independent properties of the world. In other words, in some or all domains
of science, the knowledge we get can never reach, as it were, `how things
really are', being trapped within `how things look like from here'.
A yet stronger type of perspectivalism is ontological. The rough idea is
that some or all facts are perspective-dependent; not only our knowledge of
them. Ontic perspectivalism entails non-innocuous epistemic perspectival-
ism: if the nature of entities and properties in the world is perspective-
dependent, then our knowledge of them can only be perspective-dependent
(Chakravartty 2010). Epistemic and ontic perspectivalism can be limited
or universal: they can be true of some domains of knowledge or some parts
of the world, while being false of other domains or parts. Given my pur-
poses in the foregoing, I will focus only on perspectivalism about physical
computation.
A further distinction that will play an important role in what follows
is that between what I call `thin' and `thick' conceptions of explanatory
perspective. Thin explanatory perspectives are relatively unconstrained.
11The taxonomy I offer here follows Chakravartty (2010). See also Giere (2006), Mor-
rison (2011), Massimi (2018), Ismael (2016).
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They are individuated simply by appeal to the interests and purposes of
one or a few individuals. I can take the perspective of seeing my lamp as
computing the identity function, because, say, I am interested in illustrating
a distinction. Thin perspectives are highly arbitrary and very liberal: with
the exception of basic constraints of individual rationality and responsiveness
to evidence, there are few if any restrictions on the perspectives that may
be taken toward (parts of) the world.
By contrast, thick explanatory perspectives are much more constrained,
insofar as they embody richer epistemic structures12, i.e. theoretical commit-
ments, methodological and evaluative standards of (scientific) communities,
modelling practices, explanatory aims, and so on (Massimi 2018). Thick
perspectives are much more demanding and much less arbitrary than thin
perspectives, inasmuch as they depend not only on the purposes and in-
terests of single individuals, but rather on a sophisticated, socially created
and maintained collective endeavour with stringent normative standards.
With these distinctions in hand, I will assess the plausibility of sev-
eral varieties of computational perspectivalism, especially in light of the de-
siderata mentioned above, namely avoiding pancomputationalism, making
space for miscomputation, and capturing the explanatory practices of the
computer and cognitive sciences. I will argue that thick varieties succeed
in respecting the first two desiderata, though as I will show in section 5,
fundamental problems lurk elsewhere, especially when it comes to satisfying
the third one.
4 Computational Perspectivalism
Dewhurst's (2018a) computational perspectivalism draws inspiration from
a type of perspectivalism recently defended by Craver (2013), and which
is motivated and finds its application within the neo-mechanistic approach
to scientific knowledge and explanation. I will label it `mechanistic per-
spectivalism'.
According to mechanistic perspectivalism, functions are not reducible to
the causal structure of the world. They are rather ways of carving that
complex and rich causal structure into mechanisms, in accordance with the
instrumental and explanatory interests of agents. Mechanisms, as we have
seen, are explanatory of capacities that systems display, of functions they
12From now on, I will often drop the qualifier `explanatory' when talking about explan-
atory perspectives.
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perform. Ascribing functions to parts of the world leads to carving its causal
structure in terms of the entities and activities responsible for the capacities
of interest. That is to say, ascribing functions filters the causal nexus so as to
yield a mechanistic nexus: a mechanistic hierarchy with a specific capacity
as its topping off point (Craver 2013). Function ascription depends on a
perspective, on a choice about what features of the causal structure of the
world to privilege. We take such perspectives in light of our explanatory
interests and instrumental needs in each case.
Different perspectives lead to ascription of different capacities, and hence
to the individuation of different mechanisms in the world that explain the
performance of those capacities. Importantly, the structure of the world
constrains what perspectives can be taken, what functions can be ascribed,
and which mechanisms are relevant to explaining those functions. Given
a function ascription, only one (or a few) mechanistic explanations will be
acceptable. This is so because, according to Craver, given a certain ex-
planandum only some ways of carving the perspective-independent causal
structure of the world yield appropriate explanations.
Craver's mechanistic perspectivalism is a form of innocuous perspectival-
ism, inasmuch as it holds that the parts and activities appealed to in mech-
anistic explanations are perspective-independent features of the causal struc-
ture of the world. It is the way we group them together into mechanisms
that is perspective-dependent, insofar as ascription of function is dependent
on our explanatory interests and purposes. For instance, if I am interested
in explaining the computational capacities of my laptop computer, I will
carve it in terms of transistors, memory components, etc. If instead I am
interested in explaining its capacity to disperse heat in the environment, I
will carve it in terms of power sources, heat-generating components, fans,
etc. While these two explanations individuate components within my laptop
computer differently, they both capture aspects of its causal structure.
Teleological functions, on the other hand, do not capture anything ob-
jective in the world by the lights of mechanistic perspectivalism: the causal
structure of the world does not ground talk of goals, purposes, and pref-
erential states (Craver 2013, p. 147). Ascription of teleology to physical
systems is something we do for pragmatic or heuristic reasons. There is
no perspective-independent notion of teleofunction to be had, and thereby
no purely objective grounds for claims about proper function and malfunc-
tion. Mechanistic perspectivalism endorses at most a sort of instrumentalism
about teleofunctions, these being ultimately grounded on our choices, rather
than on the objective organisation of the world.
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Dewhurst (2018a) shares Craver's scepticism about teleological functions.
For a sceptic about teleofunctions the teleo-based account of mechanistic
computation offered in section 2 is wrong-headed. It relies on an objective,
robust notion of teleological function for computational individuation. If
there are no objective teleofunctions; if these are essentially interest-based
heuristics for carving up causal structures, we cannot use them to ground
an objective notion of physical computation.
Dewhurst suggests that the appeal to teleological functions be replaced
with a perspectival notion of function. In his perspectivalist view, a mech-
anism is computational only relative to an explanatory perspective: a mech-
anism has the function to compute only in contexts where this function
contributes to our explanation of some phenomenon (Dewhurst 2018a, p.
573). Computational systems are thus all those physical systems that possess
the appropriate physical structure such that they are interpretable as per-
forming computations from some explanatory perspective (Dewhurst 2018a,
p. 581).
Let us see how this picture fares when confronted with the desiderata on
theories of computation presented above.
4.1 Computational Perspectivalism and Pancomputa-
tionalism
Dewhurst seems to accept a rather liberal notion of explanatory perspect-
ive. For he claims that we can take a computational explanatory perspective
toward (almost) any physical system, whereby a limited form of pancompu-
tationalism follows from perspectivalism (Dewhurst 2018a, p. 585). There
are always ways of carving a (minimally causally complex) physical system
such that its states and processes can be seen as implementing computa-
tions (Chalmers 2011). It would follow that (almost) every physical system
computes at least one function; or more weakly, houses at least one compu-
tational mechanism formed by a subset of its physical states. Moreover, a
single system may be appropriately seen as performing more than one com-
putation at the same time. Physical systems can be described at different
causal levels, and each of these levels may be interpreted as performing one
or more computations.
Nevertheless, there is a limited range of acceptable computational de-
scriptions. The physical structure of the system constrains what computa-
tional descriptions are legitimate. For instance, computational descriptions
that posit computational elements, such as digits, that do not match the
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physical structure of the system  e.g. because the system does not respond
systematically to those elements, and thus does not follow a rule defined over
them  are excluded. The constraints on legitimate computational explan-
ations imposed by the physical structure of the system allow the resulting
view of computational individuation to avoid triviality. Physical systems
cannot be seen as performing every computation, given that most compu-
tational ascriptions would fail to respect the physical organisation of the
system, or respect it to a lower degree than other, better ascriptions13. The
account does not thereby fall prey to the more troubling, trivialising unlim-
ited form of pancomputationalism, i.e. the claim that every physical system
computes every function. Dewhurst (2018a) accepts these consequences of
perspectivalism about computation, arguing that only unlimited pancompu-
tationalism leads to triviality and jeopardises the explanatory purchase of
computation. A theory of physical computation, he holds, can comfortably
live with limited pancomputationalism.
Although I agree that limited pancomputationalism does not trivialise
computation, I believe that computational perspectivalism need not lead
to pancomputationalism, not even of the limited sort; thus sidestepping
any worries about limited pancomputationalism failing to capture scientific
practice or endangering the explanatory role of computation in computer
and cognitive science. Limited pancomputationalism only follows from a
thin view of explanatory perspectives on which they are determined by little
more than some individual or other ascribing computational function to a
system. In consequence, there are very few constraints on which systems can
be seen computationally, and on what computational ascriptions are appro-
priate. However, this view of explanatory perspectives is not the kind of
perspectivalism relevant to science. Explanatory perspectives are grounded
on rich collective and historically-shaped scientific endeavours, with their
specific theoretical assumptions, methodological lore, theoretical posits, and
set of phenomena that are their explanatory targets. Explanatory perspect-
ives, on this `thicker' understanding, place considerable constraints on what
features of the world can fall under their purview.
Perspectivalism in philosophy of science is typically concerned with thick
perspectives. In consequence, I will focus on the stronger version of compu-
13Dewhurst (2018a) seems to prefer a criterion based on Kolmogorov complexity for
measuring the degree of fit between computational ascriptions and the physical organ-
isation of systems (see also Milkowski 2013). Assessment of whether this criterion or
alternative ones are plausible is beyond the scope of this paper. I will thus assume
throughout that some such criterion is adequate.
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tational perspectivalism that follows from accepting thick perspectivalism,
which, as I will show, has better prospects for meeting the desiderata of a
theory of physical computation. This thicker view of explanatory perspect-
ives invites the addition of further constraints that systems liable to be seen
under the computational perspective need to satisfy. Under thick computa-
tional perspectivalism, computational systems are, as before, those systems
to which we can take a computational perspective. But by enriching com-
putational perspectives, not every system may be such that we can take a
computational perspective toward it, hence avoiding limited pancomputa-
tionalism.
One first criterion for enriching the computational explanatory perspect-
ive is the appeal to medium-independence, which is part and parcel of the
mechanistic view. The computational perspective applies to those capacit-
ies of systems for which an explanation in terms of medium-independent
vehicles can be given. Digestive systems as digestive systems, for instance,
are excluded. To explain digestion, one must arguably appeal to properties
that can only be individuated medium-dependently, i.e. kinds of proteins,
enzymes, etc. (Piccinini 2015, p. 146). Physical computation, in con-
trast, does not require specific kinds of physical properties to be explained.
Although in each instance computational functions must be performed by
a physical substratum, what that substratum is  silicon chips, neurons,
vacuum tubes  is irrelevant to its being the performance of a computa-
tion. In brief, ascribing a computational function to a system contributes
to explaining only those phenomena that do not call for medium-dependent
mechanistic individuation of its parts and activities.
The inclusion of medium-independent individuation as a component of
computational explanatory perspectives is a welcome addition to compu-
tational perspectivalism, but it does not help much with the problem of
pancomputationalism. While digestive systems, as digestive systems, are
clearly outside the purview of the computational perspective; it is much less
clear that digestive systems, as physical systems, cannot be seen as imple-
menting medium-independently characterised operations over vehicles. It
seems possible to describe the causal structure of digestive systems in such
an abstract way that no commitment to specific physical realisers is made
(Chalmers 2011). If so, then digestive systems fall under the purview of
computational explanation; although not as digestive systems, since the phe-
nomenon that ascription of computational function will help to explain is
not digestion, given the latter's medium-dependent nature. Rather, compu-
tational explanation will reveal the fine-grained input-output functions that
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the system implements when its causal structure is medium-independently
described. Pure appeal to medium-independence, in sum, does not by itself
avoid limited pancomputationalism.
These considerations point toward further constraints on computational
perspectives. Despite it being arguably possible to explain the goings-on in
digestive systems computationally, it does not seem that this explanation
would be particularly useful or informative about their digestive capacities.
Seeing digestive systems as computational does not seem helpful either in-
strumentally or theoretically: it does not correspond to the capacities that
biology and physiology ascribe to such systems, and it does not allow us to
intervene in useful ways on digestive systems. This intuition can be fleshed
out by adding further requirements, such that the computational explanat-
ory perspective only applies to systems to which it contributes explanations
that respect plausible criteria of theoretical and instrumental adequacy.
Schweizer (2014, 2016) puts forward a list of factors that distinguish
instrumentally and theoretically interesting ascriptions of computational
nature from useless ones. Here, I will consider such factors to be embedded
in the computational explanatory perspective, helping to individuate the
systems that are adequately captured from that perspective.
First, computational ascriptions must lead to epistemic gain  they must
be such that applying them to physical systems adds something relevant to
our knowledge. This would rule out digestive systems, since we arguably
do not gain new information about their workings by seeing them under
a computational perspective, rather than under a non-computational one.
Identifying their abstract causal structure contributes little if anything to our
understanding of their relevant capacities in addition to what is contributed
by a non-computational, medium-dependent approach; and neither does it
augment, comparatively, our capacity to predict the future states of the
system.
Second, systems helpfully seen under the computational explanatory per-
spective should also be relatively versatile and reliable. Computational ex-
planation gets much of its purchase from its capacity to explain how physical
systems can reliably produce specific outputs when fed certain inputs. There
is little if any explanatory purchase in seeing my lamp as computing the
identity function  it is not computationally versatile, though it be fairly
reliable. By contrast, explaining the behaviour of my laptop computer in
terms of its execution of a word processor has considerably more explanatory
power  it helps answering the question of why the computer behaves as
it does given the inputs I produce. In consequence, the latter, but not the
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former, is liable to being seen as performing computations.
Third, the computational explanatory perspective should also embody a
manipulability constraint, insofar as the possibility of intervention and con-
trol helps to justify the explanatory and instrumental role of appeal to com-
putation. The computational perspective can be taken only toward physical
systems whose computationally individuated states can be intervened upon
such that the computational function(s) they perform change reliably and
predictably. While this constraint is plausible for what regards designed
computers  after all, we build, modify, and repair them by means of such
interventions  it may seem problematic when applied to cognitive sys-
tems, given our current ignorance of what their computational states and
processes are. This worry can be accommodated by noting that the forego-
ing requirement is best seen as an `in principle' claim. If the computational
theory of cognition is correct, then a future, fully developed and instru-
mentally powerful cognitive science will be able to identify and intervene on
those states and processes that carry out computations (qua computational
states and processes), for instance for therapeutic reasons or for building
artificial cognitive systems. If the computational theory of cognition proves
to be false, then computational perspectivalism would reject the claim that
the computational explanatory perspective should be taken toward cognit-
ive systems (while it may preserve a role for computational modelling as a
heuristic tool). These are the appropriate results, if our theory is to capture
the distinction between computational and non-computational physical sys-
tems; and be neutral on empirical questions such as the truth or falsity of
the computational theory of cognition.
On the foregoing thick version of computational perspectivalism, we can
agree with Dewhurst that to be a computational system is to be ascribed
from an explanatory perspective a computational function that helps explain
a certain phenomenon. But we should resist the claim that it follows that
every physical system can be examined under that perspective. Rather, few
systems are fit for explanation under the computational perspective, once it
is appropriately enriched. Limited pancomputationalism thereby does not
follow from (thick) computational perspectivalism.
4.2 Computational Perspectivalism and Miscomputa-
tion
Does the thick version of computational perspectivalism that I have been
examining make space for miscomputation?
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I think it does. Factors such as the explanatory targets and the accepted
conceptual and methodological framework of a certain domain of science,
as we have seen, partly constitute a (thick) explanatory perspective. Such
factors, together, ground a notion of what a certain type of system is sup-
posed to do. For under a certain explanatory perspective, a type of system
will be seen as contributing or failing to contribute to the phenomenon or
capacity that is the target of explanation, while the overall research frame-
work will help determine the proper way of individuating the system, its
causal interactions and roles, and its proper decomposition into parts and
their activities14.
Take computational neuroscience. At the basis of most of the efforts in
the field lies the idea that brains are computational systems (Kriegeskorte
& Douglas 2018). That foundational hypothesis is based, at least largely,
on independent theoretical considerations as well as on inference to the best
explanation. The notion of computation plays a central role in explaining
the capacity of cognitive processes to generate appropriate behaviour on the
basis of external inputs (e.g. sensory information) and internal states (e.g.
beliefs about the world), an achievement that no other theoretical posit has
to date been able to accomplish (Carandini & Heeger 2012, Wang & Krystal
2014).
Given the explanatory target of computational neuroscience, i.e. explain-
ing by means of computational states and processes how organisms behave,
the specific research projects it pursues have as their starting point a certain
cognitive capacity that organisms display, and which is to be, at least partly,
computationally explained. For instance, given the ability of certain kinds
of organism to acquire information about the shape of objects from visual
stimuli, it can be hypothesised that part of the explanation is that mech-
anisms within the visual system have the function to perform computations
that extract contour information from shadow information. Experimental
and modelling work can confirm or disconfirm the hypothesis, as well as
help individuate the mechanisms that perform the relevant computations
(e.g. Lehky & Sejnowski 1988, Khuu et al. 2016). The scientific framework
also has the tools to type mechanisms and their functions in such a way
that they can be generalised to a more or less extended domain of types of
organism. Contributions from other disciplines, such as evolutionary bio-
logy and ethology, may suggest possible selection processes or contributions
to objective goals that lend force to ascribing teleofunctions to the relevant
14Thus understood, Craver's (2013) mechanistic perspectivalism is thick.
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mechanisms. Therefore, if future work should establish that visual systems
include mechanisms whose function it is to perform those computations, or-
ganisms belonging to the type whose relevant mechanisms do not extract
contour information from shadow information  but rather compute some
other function  miscompute.
In brief, thick computational perspectivalism has the tools both to de-
termine, in light of conceptual and methodological considerations, what sys-
tems are to be seen as computational under a non-arbitrary explanatory
perspective; as well as which function ascriptions are appropriate given the
explanatory aims and classificatory practices embedded in the explanatory
perspective.
It is possible that different (thick) explanatory perspectives may ascribe
different computational functions to the same mechanisms, perhaps even in
such a way that they take as instances of correct computation what current
computational neuroscience sees as instances of miscomputation. Similarly,
within computational neuroscience incompatible hypotheses about the com-
putational functions of certain brain mechanisms may be put forward. From
this, however, it does not follow that the notion of miscomputation is trivial,
or arbitrary. For any alternative framework would be in direct competition
with current computational neuroscience. Its different methodological and
classificatory practices, which lead to the alternative function ascriptions,
would need to be assessed and compared to the current framework in light
of the preferred theoretical, methodological, and evidential virtues that the
relevant scientific communities adopt as criteria for theory choice. Ana-
logously, incompatible hypotheses within computational neuroscience would
be in competition, and the choice between them dictated by the criteria
for theory choice of the field. What would trivialise miscomputation is the
claim that there is no non-arbitrary way of distinguishing appropriate from
inappropriate computational function ascriptions. Showing that there is
competition between scientific frameworks or hypotheses falls considerably
short from lending force to that claim (Morrison 2011)15.
In sum, thick computational perspectivalism can make space for miscom-
15As an aside, note that thin computational perspectivalism has trouble giving a non-
trivial account of miscomputation. For given the few constraints imposed on perspectives
and what falls under them, one is free to prescribe different computational functions
to the same system under the same mechanistic decomposition  i.e. preserving all
individuated parts and activities. It follows that any physical system can legitimately be
seen as correctly computing a function f, and equally legitimately as miscomputing an
indefinite number of functions g, h, q ...
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putation, thereby fulfilling the relevant desideratum on theories of physical
computation. What remains to be seen is to what extent computational per-
spectivalism differs from standard, teleo-based theories of computation. And
if it does differ, what species of perspectivalism it is: innocuous, epistemic,
or ontic. It is by considering these questions, I suggest, that the problems
with computational perspectivalism come to surface. Even though it has
the tools to satisfy desiderata (i) and (ii), it has trouble with descriptive
accuracy and explanatory adequacy as prescribed by (iii).
5 The Varieties of Computational
Perspectivalism Assessed
Computational perspectivalism has it that attribution of computational func-
tions, and thereby of computational nature to physical systems depends on
taking a specific kind of explanatory perspective toward them. As we have
seen, a thick version of the view is particularly attractive, since it seems to
do away with the potentially problematic appeal to objective teleofunctions,
whilst keeping at bay pancomputationalism and making space for miscompu-
tation. In this section, I examine whether these apparent advantages survive
a closer look. I argue that computational perspectivalism ends up in an un-
comfortable dilemma. If it tries to be an innocuous kind of perspectivalism,
it either collapses into causal views of computation, or into the teleo-based
mechanistic account. If on the other hand stronger forms of perspectivalism
are upheld, the resulting views suffer from important shortcomings.
The central criterion that distinguishes innocuous from non-innocuous
types of perspectivalism is the commitment, or lack thereof, to there being
perspective-independent facts about the world, and about which we can ac-
quire knowledge. In the case of computational perspectivalism, the claim
is limited to computational facts. Innocuous computational perspectivalism
has it that by means of the relevant thick explanatory perspective(s) we
acquire knowledge about the perspective-independent nature and structure
of computational physical systems. Epistemic computational perspectival-
ism is neutral about the perspective-independent existence of computational
physical systems, for it holds only that we cannot know any perspective-
independent facts about them. Ontic computational perspectivalism, fi-
nally, claims that the notion of computation is ontologically dependent on
the perspectives that we take, and thereby that computational systems, as
computational, have no perspective-independent existence.
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Let us now turn to the relations between the varieties of computational
perspectivalism and the other accounts currently on offer, with an eye to
assessing their relative promise.
5.1 Innocuous Computational Perspectivalism
According to innocuous computational perspectivalism, computational ex-
planations (i.e. explanations from a computational explanatory perspective)
tap into objective, non-perspectival features of the world. First, they cap-
ture, as a minimum, perspective-independent aspects of the causal organ-
isation of physical systems: the causal regularities instantiated by types of
internal states and their transitions describable by a computational function.
Second, as we have seen in section 4.2, thick explanatory perspectives also
include prescriptions about how a computational system should behave, i.e.
what its proper or normal behaviour is. This introduces a sort of normativity
into the notion of computation, making space for miscomputation. Varieties
of innocuous computational perspectivalism all agree on the former claim,
while they differ for what regards the latter. More precisely, there are two
stances that an innocuous perspectivalist may take toward the normativity
of physical computation.
First, a computational perspectivalist may deny that normativity is es-
sential to the notion of computation, seeing function ascription as merely
heuristic. This seems to be the view that Dewhurst (2018a) prefers. As I ar-
gued in section 2.1, however, this position is unsatisfactory. It is equivalent
to a purely causal theory of computation, as the one defended by Chalmers
(2011), whereby computation is little more than a label for abstract causal
structure. As we have seen, on causal theories the notion of computation
has no distinctive explanatory value over and above that of abstract causal
structure. Moreover, denying that computation is normative fails to make
space for miscomputation, and thus does not do justice to our best com-
puter and cognitive sciences, in which miscomputation plays an important
explanatory role. For these reasons, I take that this form of innocuous per-
spectivalism, which is actually a causal theory of computation, should be
rejected.
A second option is to hold that normativity is essential to physical com-
putation, and that function ascriptions made from the relevant explanatory
perspective(s) capture perspective-independent features of computational
systems. This view has much to recommend it, but it is indiscernible from
the mechanistic account presented in section 2. For it accepts that the
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relevant explanatory perspectives reveal both the perspective-independent
causal structure of computational systems, which mechanistic decomposi-
tion captures; and the teleofunctions to compute that those systems have
independent of our explanatory perspectives, which are captured by theories
of teleological function. This second sort of innocuous computational per-
spectivalism, as much as the first, is not a distinct theory. It is just the kind
of innocuous perspectivalism that the teleo-based mechanistic view accepts
(Piccinini 2015, p. 142).
Another option is to accept that normativity is essential to the notion of
physical computation, but hold that it depends intrinsically on explanatory
perspectives. This kind of perspectivalism is no longer innocuous. For if
it claims that computation essentially involves miscomputation, and that
miscomputation essentially depends on explanatory perspectives, then the
notion of computation may not capture perspective-independent features of
the world. A strong form of perspectivalism is thus at play, to be examined
in the next section.
In sum, innocuous computational perspectivalism, contra Dewhurst (2018a),
is not really in the cards. It collapses into existing theories of computation,
either causal or teleo-mechanistic. The perspectivalist about computation
has other options available, but they are far from innocuous.
5.2 Non-Innocuous Computational Perspectivalism
Epistemic computational perspectivalism is the view that we cannot acquire
perspective-independent knowledge about physical computational systems.
The view only makes an epistemic claim, and is therefore neutral on the
ontological status of physical computation. There are two main grounds for
holding epistemic computational perspectivalism: a) because the notion of
computation is instrumentally or pragmatically useful, but may not corres-
pond to actual features of the world; or b) because computation is ontolo-
gically dependent on explanatory perspectives. The former is identical, or
close enough, to instrumentalism about computation. The latter is identical
to ontic perspectivalism. In what follows I will examine these two varieties
of non-innocuous computational perspectivalism in turn.
Computational Instrumentalism
Schweizer (2016, 2019) advocates an explicitly instrumentalist theory of com-
putation. According to him, the notion of computation does not capture
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objective features of the world, but is nonetheless a useful conceptual tool
that plays a heuristic role in several scientific fields  especially in the com-
puter and cognitive sciences. Performing computations is not a property
that physical systems have objectively, but rather depends on an `purely
observer-dependent act of ascription'. Such computational ascriptions are
constrained in their scientific appropriateness by pragmatic constraints that
make appeal to computation more or less useful  the most central of which
were introduced above, in section 4. For Schweizer, application of some or
all of these constraints depends on the explanatory context. Different ex-
planatory and instrumental contexts motivate the employment of pragmatic
constraints which may play no role in other contexts.
Even in those contexts in which application of the notion of computation
is explanatorily useful, there is no ontological commitment to the systems un-
der investigation performing computations. Although these considerations
are compatible with a neutral position on the (perspective-independent) ex-
istence of physical computations, Schweizer rejects the idea that there are
physical systems that actually compute. His instrumentalism is underlain
by ontological eliminativism about computation. His main argument for
this claim is a familiar one. He agrees that miscomputation is essential to
computation, that is, that the notion of computation is cogent only if it
includes a normative element. However, like Craver (2013), Schweizer is
sceptical about natural teleology. Therefore, the normativity of computa-
tion, according to him, can only come from prescriptive interpretations that
observers impose on physical systems. Physical computation cannot thereby
be a perspective-independent feature of systems in the world.
There are several problems with instrumentalism about computation.
First, one of its underlying motivations, i.e. scepticism about natural tele-
ology, seems problematic when we look at the explanatory practices of the
life sciences. The notion of teleological function is part and parcel of several
of our mature biological sciences, as is the appeal to normative considera-
tions to explain deviations from appropriate functioning in terms of abnor-
mal internal workings or abnormality in the environment. As we have seen,
there are several plausible proposals on how to naturalise teleology. Sch-
weizer (2019) quickly dismisses these attempts, in a way similar to Craver
(2013), on the grounds that teleofunctions are underlain purely by causal-
historical factors. However, this is hardly a counterargument: the project of
naturalisation is exactly to rid the notion of `anthropomorphic heuristics',
grounding it in causal features of the world. Borrowing Jerry Fodor's fam-
ous phrase (originally about naturalising intentionality), if teleofunctions are
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real, they must be really something else.
For a sceptic about teleofunctions, the considerations above may be un-
convincing. They may think that the promise of current theories of natural
teleology is only apparent and will not hold out. This sort of sceptical chal-
lenge is notably difficult to counter a priori. Although I cannot offer a full
defence of natural teleology here, the fruitfulness of the notion in scientific
practice, as well as the philosophical consensus around its explanatory role
(if not its nature), provide at least prima facie reasons to place the burden
of proof on the sceptic16.
Second, analogous considerations from explanatory adequacy and de-
scriptive accuracy regarding scientific practice suggest another way in which
perspectivalism is problematic. The computer and cognitive sciences seem,
at least often enough, to be committed to the claim that the systems they
build and investigate are really computational; in contrast to systems that
can merely be modelled computationally. By denying that computations
are objective features of the world, instrumentalism about computation is
at odds with these practices. If we consider explanatory adequacy and de-
scriptive accuracy to be relevant criteria for philosophical theory choice, as
per desideratum (iii), realist views of computation such as the teleo-based
mechanistic account have the upper hand17.
Instrumentalists about computation can reply in two ways. First, they
may endorse a general instrumentalist view of science in which the theor-
etical posits of our best sciences do not involve ontological commitment,
making the considerations above void. Although this is an acceptable move,
it makes computational instrumentalism lose much interest, given that it
simply flows from a much broader instrumentalism about scientific posits 
assessment of which is well beyond the scope of this paper. Second, and more
interestingly, computational instrumentalism may be defended by showing:
i) that there are good reasons for withholding ontological commitment to
computation specifically; and ii) that other factors make it so that the no-
tion is nonetheless ineliminable from our best explanations in computer and
cognitive science18. Let us start with ii), which I believe helps shed light on
i).
16For analyses and defence of the role of teleofunctions in the life sciences as well as of
influential naturalistic theories of teleology, see Godfrey-Smith (1993), Griffiths (1993),
Huneman (2013), Neander (2017).
17Sprevak (2018) also appeals to explanatory adequacy and descriptive accuracy in
criticising anti-realist approaches to computation in the cognitive sciences.
18I am indebted to an anonymous referee to this journal for pressing me on this point.
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As we have seen, Schweizer claims that appeal to computation is useful
insofar as it allows better prediction, intervention, and control when applied
to complex physical systems that feature certain types of flexible and reli-
able behaviour. Applying the notion of computation to such systems leads
to epistemic and instrumental gains, justifying the presence of the notion
in scientific explanations despite the denial of ontological commitment to
computation. Thus, the instrumentalist may reply, we need not ontologic-
ally commit to computations in order to recognise the explanatory role and
purchase of the notion in our best sciences.
I take this line of reasoning to be unconvincing. The epistemic and
instrumental advantages that computation provide us with are themselves
in need of explanation. If those advantages are due to the fact that the
notion best captures actual features of systems relevant for some kinds of
explanation, e.g. how they reliably and flexibly transition from a variety
of different inputs to task-appropriate outputs, then it becomes unclear in
which sense ontological commitment to computation is being denied. It
may turn out that such epistemic and instrumental considerations lead to
different views of the nature of physical computation than the ones currently
on offer, but the resulting view will nonetheless be realist.
It may be replied that the instrumentalist actually makes a weaker claim
than the one I suggest above  a claim about usefulness, while I helped my-
self to the idea that computation best captures some features of the world.
But this reply is of no help, for it does not explain why our best explan-
ations in computer and cognitive science appeal to physical computation.
Appeal to mere usefulness without ontological commitment implies  short
of general scientific instrumentalism  that the computer and cognitive sci-
ences can (and should) come up with better explanations that involve only
posits that we ontologically commit to. The instrumentalist about computa-
tion, however, has provided no clear guidance about what those explanations
should look like.
Moreover, the principle of inference to the best explanation (IBE) spells
trouble for instrumentalism: if positing computations is the best way to ex-
plain some phenomena, as least at the current state of our best sciences,
then we should, as a working hypothesis at least, commit to their exist-
ence. The computational perspectivalist can resist this argument only by
either denying the principle of inference to the best explanation in general,
thus sliding toward a general instrumentalist view of science as a whole; or
denying that IBE applies to the notion of computation in particular.
The former strategy, as we have seen, is not particularly interesting for a
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theory of physical computation. The latter, on the other hand, is motivated
by two claims that we are already familiar with, and that bring us back to
i) above: computation is normative, and there are no sources of normativity
beside perspectival ascription. Therefore, theoretical posits that appeal to
normativity, such as computation, are non-innocuously perspectival. Scep-
ticism about natural teleology, as I pointed out, is at the heart of compu-
tational perspectivalism. Not much else speaks in favour of the view, as I
hope to have shown. But I hope to have also shown that this is a rather
problematic foundation for non-innocuous computational perspectivalism.
Although the philosophical controversy about natural teleology is far from
solved, there are at present good, though defeasible reasons for accepting
the claim that teleofunctions are bona fide features of the world.
Even if one should prefer to remain neutral about natural teleology, at-
tention to practice in the relevant sciences, and especially to the role of
IBE in them, suggests that we should ontologically commit, as a working
hypothesis, to physical computation. As Sprevak (2013) points out, most
of the knowledge acquired by the cognitive sciences stems from accepting
the posits that best explain the relatively partial and indirect experimental
data available. Computation is one of these posits. There is not much left
to guide cognitive science and justify its practices and results if IBE is (even
partially) abandoned.
Finally, computational instrumentalism, if wedded to ontological elimin-
ativism, a priori forbids a computational theory of cognition, a consequence
that both Dewhurst (2018a) and Schweizer (2019) endorse. For if compu-
tation is only in the eye of the beholder, it cannot be at the foundation of
what allows observers to behold, interpret, and ascribe  on pain of vicious
circularity. At best, we can see the computational view of cognition as a
useful fictional model, but not as a hypothesis about the nature of cognitive
systems and of how they bring about intelligent behaviour. The hypothesis
that cognition and intelligence are made possible partly by the performance
of computations, one of the bases of cognitive science (and of much philo-
sophy of mind), is taken out of the table by pure armchair reflection. This
is a problematic way of rejecting an empirical hypothesis, oblivious to its
scientific fruitfulness, (dis)confirming evidence, and explanatory purchase19.
In brief, instrumentalism about computation is problematic, especially
when compared to ontologically committed accounts of computation, such
19Ontologically neutral computational instrumentalism, on the other hand, leads to
permanent quietism about the computational theory of cognition, a similarly problematic
stance to take toward an empirical hypothesis.
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as the teleo-based mechanistic view. The latter, in contrast to the former,
is descriptively adequate, capturing the usage of the notion of computation
in the computer and cognitive sciences; it is explanatorily adequate, doing
justice to the explanatory practices and commitments of our best sciences;
and it does not preclude a priori the truth of the driving hypothesis of cog-
nitive science, i.e. that cognition is at least partly computational. These
arguments are perhaps not as decisive as a realist may have wanted, but
I think they are enough to shift the burden of proof to the computational
instrumentalist, and to justify lending more credence to realism about com-
putation than to instrumentalist views.
Ontic perspectivalism
The other non-innocuous option for the computational perspectivalist fares
no better, and for largely similar reasons, so my treatment here will be brief.
On ontic perspectivalism about computation, facts about computational
systems and processes are intrinsically dependent on perspectives, there be-
ing no non-perspectival facts about physical computation. Although ontic
perspectivalism, in contrast to instrumentalism, ontologically commits to
computation, it is unclear that it can be made plausible. Ontic perspectival-
ism claims that physical computation exists, but that its existence depends
on perspectives we take toward the world. However, physical computation,
in contrast to money, universities, social and political institutions, seems to
be the wrong kind of thing to have its existence depend on mental states
and/or social practices of sentient beings, or on the scientific perspectives
they take20. In a weaker sense, the notion of computation does depend
on our explanatory practices, on scientific communities, and so forth. The
concept has been developed within certain explanatory projects, and its ap-
plication in various branches of science depends on standards of scientific
and explanatory adequacy. However, our sciences are mostly committed to
the claim that natural and artificial computational systems exist, and would
exist even in the absence of individuals and communities taking perspectives
toward them.
20If the only computational systems in the universe are cognitive systems and artificial
computers designed by them, then there is a kind of ontological dependence at play:
computational systems would not have existed were it not for the existence of cognitive
systems. However, this is not the relevant kind of dependence. Ontic perspectivalism
claims that computation is ontologically dependent on explanatory perspectives taken by
cognitive systems, not on the existence of cognitive systems per se.
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Moreover, even if ontic perspectivalism about computation could be
made plausible, it would share most of the shortcomings of computational in-
strumentalism. It precludes the hypothesis that cognition is computational,
on pain of circularity; and it does not square well with the ontological com-
mitments of the computer and cognitive sciences, since they do not typically
take the existence of computational systems to depend on explanatory per-
spectives we take.
In sum, non-innocuous forms of computational perspectivalism are unsat-
isfactory. They fare badly when compared to teleo-based mechanistic views
of computation. Eschewing natural teleology from the account of physical
computation proves to be too high a price to pay for little gain.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I have argued that perspectival theories of computational in-
dividuation, as currently proposed, are not satisfactory. Innocuous compu-
tational perspectivalism is indiscernible from existing realist views of com-
putation, of which the most plausible is the teleo-based mechanistic ac-
count. Non-innocuous versions of computational perspectivalism, on the
other hand, have several important shortcomings. The mechanistic view is
therefore to be preferred, despite its richer ontological commitments.
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